Abstract: This paper presents new short decryption exponent attacks on RSA, which successfully leads to the factorization of RSA modulus N = pq in polynomial time. The paper has two parts. In the first part, we report the usage of the small prime difference method of the form |b 2 p − a 2 q| < N γ where the ratio of , where we establish that t RSA moduli can be simultaneously factored in polynomial time using combinations of simultaneous Diophantine approximations and lattice basis reduction methods. In all the reported attacks, we have found an improved short secret exponent bound, which is considered to be better than some bounds as reported in the literature.
. The second part of the paper reports four cryptanalytic attacks on t instances of RSA moduli N s = p s q s for s = 1, 2, . . . , t where we use N − a 2 +b 2 ab
Introduction
The RSA cryptosystem is the most widely used public key cryptosystem, invented by three mathematicians, Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman [1] and since then has been extensively used for many applications in the government as well as commercial domain, which include e-banking, secure telephone, smart cards, and communications in different types of networks [2] .
RSA key generation involves a random selection of two distinct large prime numbers such that their product is represented as N = pq and called an RSA modulus. The Euler totient function φ(N) is computed as φ(N) = (p − 1)(q − 1). Additionally, choose an integer e < φ(N) such that gcd(e, φ(N)) = 1 and compute short decryption exponent d such that the relation ed ≡ 1 (mod φ(N)) is satisfied. Then, (e, N) are the public pair and (d, p, q) are private key tuple.
The encryption function is computed by choosing a message M ∈ Z N and computing the ciphertext C = M e (mod N), while the plaintext can be recovered by computing the decryption exponent from equation M = C d (mod N). The primes p and q in most cases are considered to have same bit-length.
M := C d (mod N) 4: end for 5: return the message M.
The security of an RSA cryptosystem depends on the difficulty of solving the integer factorization problem, the failure of an adversary to compute the secret key d from RSA key equation ed = 1 + kφ(N), where only the public key e is given as outlined in Algorithm 1 and the difficulty of solving the e th -root problem of C = M e (mod N) as outlined in Algorithm 2. The problem of computing d from (e, N) is equivalent to the problem of factoring RSA modulus N into its nontrivial prime factors of p and q, as proven by Reference [3] . It is therefore recommended for RSA users to generate primes p and q in such a way that the problem of factoring N = pq is computationally infeasible for an adversary. Choosing p and q as strong primes has been recommended as a way of maximizing the difficulty of factoring RSA modulus N.
In an RSA cryptosystem, there are public key pairs (e, N) and private key tuples (d, p, q, φ(N)). Once the private key d is known, it can lead to the total break of RSA. It is often tempting to use a small decryption exponent so as to speed up computation in RSA decryption and signature verification. However, this poses a great security challenge to the system. A very small decryption exponent can be broken by a trivial brute force exhaustive search to find the correct decryption exponent. For instance, all private exponents d < 2 60 can be recovered easily, but it is computationally infeasible to recover all private exponents d < 2 80 by brute force attack [4] .
The first attack on small decryption exponent was reported by Wiener in 1990 . He showed that RSA is insecure if the small decryption exponent is d < 1 3 N 0.25 using the continued fractions method to recover d from the convergents of the continued fractions expansion of e N , [5] . Since then, many attacks on short decryption exponents emerged, which improved the bound. Boneh and Durfee (1999) proposed an attack on the small decryption exponent using the Coppersmith lattice-based technique, in which they heuristically showed that RSA in insecure if d < N 0.292 , as reported by Reference [6] .
In another development, B. De Weger (2002) also used the primes difference method to carry out an attack on RSA modulus N = pq, where he proved that if d < N 3 4 |p−q|
, then the RSA cryptosystem is considered to be insecure where primes p and q have the same bit-length, which is an improvement on Wiener's bound as reported by Reference [7] . In addition, Maitra and Sarkar (2008) improved the work of Reference [7] using the prime difference method of |2q − p| < N γ and showed that RSA is not secure if d < N 1−γ 2 , as reported by Reference [8] . Furthermore, Chen's et al. (2009) have generalized the work of Reference [7] , where they proposed an attack using the generalization method, in which they proved that RSA modulus N = pq can be broken if |ap − bq| = N γ and d < N . Substituting a = b = 1 gave the approximation of φ(N) as reported by [7] . Also, taking a = 2 and b = 1 gave approximation of φ(N) as reported by Reference [8] . In their experiment result, they used the value of γ = 0.5 to justify their theorem, as reported by Reference [9] . , as reported [11] . This paper reports the use of the small prime difference method to factor the RSA modulus N and its relation to further extend the bound of weak decryption exponents. Given public key pair (e, N), we exploited RSA key equation ed = 1 + kφ(N) and broke the instances of RSA by factoring the modulus N into its nontrivial prime factors p and q. We also reported four cryptanalytic attacks on factoring t RSA moduli using a system of equations where, in one instance, the moduli (e s , N s ) shared a common decryption exponent d and, in another scenario, every pair (e s , N s ) had its own unique decryption exponent d s . The method uses |b 2 p − a 2 q| < N γ such that if the ratio of q p is close to the ratio of . Our bound is considered to be an improved bound of that of References [5, 9, 11] . This paper also presents an experimental result which shows that taking γ = 15 32 , we can recover primes p and q if the private
. This is an improvement of the result of Reference [9] , as they did not give an experiment result of γ < 0.5.
The second part of the paper presents t instances of factoring RSA moduli N s = p s q s for t = 1, 2, . . . , t by transforming generalized key equations of the form
, and e s d s − kφ(N s ) = z s for unknown parameters d, k s , d s , k s , and z s into simultaneous Diophantine problem and applying the lattice basis reduction and LLL methods to find the values of d, k s , d s , and k. We formulated a quadratic equation which enabled us to find t prime factors p s and q s and finally factorize t moduli N 1 , N 2 , . . . , N t in polynomial time. We have found decryption exponents bounds that are greater than those of References [12, 13] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a review of some preliminary results on continued fractions and state some theorems that are related to our work. Section 3 presents our proposed findings and discussion on the results. We give experimental results to illustrate our theorems, which show how an incorrect choice of d can lead to the factorization of RSA modulus N = pq in polynomial time. Finally, in Section 4, we conclude the paper.
Preliminaries and Methods
In this section, we state some basics on continued fraction, the lattice basis reduction technique, simultaneous Diophantine approximations, and theorems related to our work.
Definition 1 (Continued fractions).
For any positive x ∈ R, define x 0 = x and for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, do x i = a i , x i+1 = 1 x i −a i until x n ∈ Z. Then, x can be expanded as continued fraction in following form,
This expression is often used in the form x = [a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n , . . .]. Any rational number a b can be expressed as a finite continued fraction x = [a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ]. 
In this situation, we say that b 1 , . . . , b n are the basis for L or that they span L. 
The basis B is said to be LLL reduced if it satisfies the following two conditions:
Equivalently, it can be written as: Proof. See Reference [14] . 
Theorem 3. (Wiener, 1990) . Let N = pq be an RSA modulus with q < p < 2q. Let e < φ(N) be a public exponent and d be the corresponding private key. If d < 
Proof. See Reference [15] .
We will use the following Theorem 9 in our proofs of Theorems 14-17.
Theorem 9.
(Simultaneous Diophantine Approximations) (Nitaj et al., 2014) . Given any rational numbers of the form α 1 , . . . , α n and 0 < ε < 1, there is a polynomial time algorithm to compute integers p 1 , . . . , p n and a positive integer q such that: 
The Proposed Findings and Discussion
In this section, we present our findings. The first part reported a short secret exponent attack on RSA modulus N = pq, where p and q are prime numbers of the same bit-length. We show that if d < which leads to the factorization of RSA modulus N in polynomial time. In the second part of the paper, we presented four cryptanalytic attacks using a generalized key equation of the shape In this section, we present two lemmas and a theorem with numerical examples. 
Adding 2a 2 b 2 pq to both sides we have,
Lemma 2. Let p and q be prime numbers where q < p < 2q and N = pq. If,
Proof of Lemma 2. We first compute,
Theorem 13. Let p and q be prime numbers, where q < p < 2q and N = pq. Given the pair (e, N) for e < φ(N) as a public key pair and (d,p,q) as a private key tuple, let Proof of Theorem 13.
then from Lemma 2 we have,
Using RSA key equation ed − kφ(N) = 1, for some k ∈ Z, this gives us, e φ(N)
.
Finally,
Now, assuming that N − a 2 +b 2 ab
5 N and N > 10d, where a and b are small positive integers, plugging the conditions into above inequality (Equation (1)), we get,
Hence, we have, e N − a 2 +b 2 ab
This shows that Theorem 13 produces . This terminates the proof.
This is an improvement on the work of Reference [9] , whose d < N Table 1 one can observe that our bound is an improvement of the abovementioned bounds. Not applicable [7] d
Not applicable
Example 1. In this example, we illustrate how to factor the RSA modulus N = pq for the case γ = , we get, N 0.28125 , that is, 1447 < 7274.146806. This shows that our private key is greater than the bounds of References [5, 11] , i.e., 753.8954627 < 1147 < 7274.146806 (bound of Reference [5] ) and 1130.843194 < 1147 < 7274.146806 (bound of Reference [11] ). This is an improvement on bounds stated in Table 1 .
System of Equations Using
In this section, we present four cryptanalytic attacks on t RSA moduli N s = p s q s using a system of equations of the form 
. In this case, the RSA instances shared common decryption exponent d. 
Let N = max{N s } and suppose that k s < N γ are positive integers and from Theorem 13, it was shown that,
We therefore have, e s N s − a 2 +b 2 ab
Hence, to show the existence of integer d and t integers k s we let ε = bN 3γ− 3 2 , with γ = 3t 2(3t+1)
. Then, we have,
Following Theorem 9, we have b t < 2
This clearly satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9, and we proceed to reveal the private key d and t integers k s for s = 1, . . . , t. Next, from equation
Finally, by finding the roots of the quadratic equation
, the prime factors p s and q s can be revealed, which lead to the factorization of t RSA moduli N s for s = 1, . . . , t in polynomial time.
Let,
Define,
Consider the lattice L spanned by the matrix,
Taking suitable small positive integers a and b, the matrix M can be used in computing the reduced basis after we apply the LLL algorithm.
Example 2.
Observe that,
By using a = 3, b = 2 and since t = 3, we will have from Algorithm 4 γ = Applying Theorem 9 and using Algorithm 4 for n = t = 3, we compute,
Therefore, by applying the LLL algorithm to L, we obtain the reduced basis with the following matrix, Next, from Algorithm 4 we proceed to compute W s for s = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, solving the quadratic equation x 2 − W s x + N s = 0 for s = 1, 2, 3 yields (p 1 , q 1 ), (p 2 , q 2 ), and (p 3 , q 3 ), which lead to the factorization of three RSA moduli N 1 , N 2 , N 3 .That is, 
Let N = max{N s } and d s < N γ , k < N γ be positive integers and from Theorem 13, it was shown that,
Additionally, suppose that e = min{e s } = N α , then we have,
Hence, we get,
We now proceed to show the existence of integer k and t integers d s . Let ε = √ 8N 3γ− 1 2 −α and
. Then, we get,
Following Theorem 9, we have 8 
This clearly satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9, and we proceed to reveal t integers of the private key d s and integer k for s = 1, . . . , t. Next, from equation e s d s − kφ(N s ) = 1 we compute,
Finally, by finding the roots of the quadratic equation x 2 − (N s − φ(N s ) + 1)x + N s = 0, the prime factors p s and q s can be found, which lead to the factorization of t RSA moduli N s for s = 1, . . . , t.
Taking suitable small positive integers a and b, the matrix M can be used in computing the reduced basis after we apply the LLL algorithm Observe that ,
e s = min{e 1 , e 2 , e 3 } = 102148699518319970718711207616780801429013, with e s = min{e 1 , e 2 , e 3 } = N α with α = 0.9750133088. By using a = 3, b = 2 and since t = 3, we will have from Algorithm 5 γ = (1+2α)t 2(3t+1) = 0.44250 and ε = √ 8N 3γ− 1 2 −α = 0.000001768531652. Applying Theorem 9 and using Algorithm 5, we compute, Consider the lattice L spanned by the matrix,
Therefore, by applying the LLL algorithm to L, we obtain the reduced basis with the following matrix, 
Next, from Algorithm 5 we proceed to compute W s for s = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, solving the quadratic equation
, and (p 3 , q 3 ) which lead to the factorization of three RSA moduli N 1 , N 2 , N 3 . That is,
From our result, one can observe that we get min{d 1 In this section, we consider another case in which t RSA moduli satisfies t equations of the form e s d s − kφ(N s ) = z s for unknown positive integers d s , k, and z s for s = 1, . . . , t.
For t ≥ 2, let N s = p s q s , for = 1, . . . , t. The attack works for t instances (N s , e s ) if there exist an integer d and t integers k s such that e s d − k s φ(N s ) = z s holds. We show that prime factors p s and q s of t RSA moduli N s for s = 1, . . . , t can be found efficiently for N = max{N s } and d, k s , and z s < N γ for all γ = Proof of Theorem 16. For t ≥ 2, and let N s = p s q s , 1 ≤ s ≤ t be t RSA moduli. Let N = max{N s } and suppose that k s < N γ . Then equation e s d − k s φ(N s ) = z s can be rewritten as,
Taking N = max{N s } and suppose that k s < N γ , z s < N γ are positive integers and from Theorem 13, it was shown that,
Plugging into Equation (5) yields,
Hence, we have, e s N s − a 2 +b 2 ab
Hence, to show the existence of integer d and t integers k s , we let ε = bN 4γ− 3 2 , with γ = 3t 2(4t+1) . Then,we have:
This also satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9, and we next proceed to reveal the private key d and t integers k s for s = 1, . . . , t. Next, from equation e s d − k s φ(N s ) = z s we compute,
Finally, by finding the roots of the quadratic equation x 2 − (N s − φ(N s ) + 1)x + N s = 0, prime factors p s and q s can be revealed, which lead to the factorization of t RSA moduli N s for s = 1, . . . , t in polynomial time.
Taking suitable small positive integers a and b, the matrix M can be used in computing the reduced basis after we apply the LLL algorithm. Observe that,
By using a = 3, b = 2 and since t = 3, we will have from Algorithm 6 γ = 3t 2(4t+1) = 0.346 and ε = bN 3γ− 3 2 = 0.00003240252930. Applying Theorem 9 and Algorithm 6 for n = t = 3 we compute, Consider the lattice L spanned by the matrix
Next, from Algorithm 6, we compute W s for s = 1, 2, 3.
Finally, solving the quadratic equation 
Let N = max{N s } for s = 1, · · · , t, and d s < N γ , k < N γ , z s < N γ be positive integers and
We now proceed to show the existence of integer k and t integers d s . Let ε = a b N 3γ− 1 2 −α and
Following Theorem 9, we have
This satisfies the conditions of Theorem 9 and we proceed to find the values of d s and k for s = 1, . . . , t. Next, from the equation e s d s − kφ(N s ) = z s we compute,
Taking suitable small positive integers a and b, the matrix M can be used in computing the reduced basis after we apply the LLL algorithm. 
Conclusions
In this paper, it has been shown that our proposed cryptanalytic attacks on RSA modulus N = pq using the prime difference method can be used efficiently. 
